Abstract: This paper identifies optimal policy rules in the presence of explicit targets for both the inflation rate and public debt. This issue is investigated in the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that describes a small open economy with capital accumulation, distortionary taxation and nominal price rigidities. The model is solved using a second-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions. Optimal policy features a strong anti-inflation stance and strict fiscal discipline. Targeting a domestic inflation index -as opposed to CPIimproves welfare because it reduces the inefficiencies that stem from both price stickiness and income taxes.
Introduction
The pursuit of a quantitative target for the in ‡ation rate and for the …scal balance characterizes macroeconomic policy in several industrial and emerging market economies. The adoption of these targets and success in achieving them became, in the case of emerging markets, a necessary condition for continued access to funds made available by international lenders of last resort. Yet, there has not been a systematic attempt to evaluate the welfare consequences of such policy mix in this kind of economic environment. The objective of this paper is to …ll in this gap.
Speci…cally, it makes two contributions. First, using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that is calibrated to the case of Brazil, this paper provides a second-order-accurate measure of welfare and calculates the welfare loss incurred in a regime in which there are explicit targets for both the level of public debt and the consumer price index (CPI) in ‡ation. Focusing on policy regimes such that the in ‡ation and the …scal target are both attainable, the main …nding is that a strong anti-in ‡ation stance, coupled with strict …scal discipline is optimal.
Speci…cally, low volatility of public debt and in ‡ation around their targets increases welfare. This result holds even though in ‡ation and government expenditures in emerging markets are more volatile than in industrial countries -hence despite the fact that a strict pursuit of the in ‡ation and the …scal target will imply more volatile tax and interest rates.
There is a simple intuition behind these results. A strong anti-in ‡ation stance is optimal because, consistent with previous …ndings in the literature, price dispersion due to nominal price rigidities generates an output loss. 1 At the same time, in the model economy studied in this paper, fast …scal adjustments are optimal because they are conducive to lower average tax rates. In other words, low public debt volatility is associated to a lower intratemporal tax distortion in the stochastic equilibrium 1 References are Goodfriend and King (1997) and King and Wolman (1999) .
(at the cost of higher tax rate volatility and increased intertemporal distortion). Depending on the type of in ‡ation index being targeted, there is even the possibility that the unconditional mean tax rate will be lower than its non-stochastic stationary level. This channel is present because agents face non-diversi…able risks that increase precautionary savings. The increase in savings can boost capital accumulation, which increases the tax base and makes room for the tax rate reduction. In the absence of strict …scal discipline, part of these savings will fund additional government borrowing, which crowds out investment. As a consequence, the tax base does not increase and the welfareimproving reduction of the tax rate is not observed.
These conclusions might suggest that emerging markets are pursuing optimal policies, provided that the volatility of in ‡ation and public debt around their targets is kept small. This paper shows that this is not an accurate statement, because typically the in ‡ation target is expressed in terms of the consumer price in ‡ation. The problem is that CPI targeting does not deliver the maximum level of welfare. Optimal policy requires that the Monetary Authority chooses to target a domestic in ‡ation index -one that is not directly a¤ected by exchange rate ‡uctuations -as opposed to targeting the CPI. This conclusion is consistent with previous …ndings in the literature of optimal monetary policy in open economies, in the presence of sticky prices.
The framework employed in this paper provides an additional explanation for why it is optimal to target a domestic in ‡ation index. For reasons that will become clear later, the positive …scal channel described above -the possibility that the average tax rate will be lower in the stochastic equilibrium -is only observed with domestic in ‡ation targeting. 2 These …ndings are reached in the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that features a small open economy with distortionary taxes, capital accumulation and staggered price setting à la Calvo (1983) . The economy has both a tradable and a nontradable goods sector, with monopolistic competition present in the latter.
Policy instruments are set according to policy rules such as in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b), Collard and Dellas (2005) and Kollman (2006) . Speci…cally, the Monetary Authority announces a target for in ‡ation and sets the nominal interest rate according to a simple Taylor-type rule. Meanwhile, the Fiscal Authority announces a public debt target and sets the tax rate according to a rule that links the evolution of the primary surplus to the behavior of public liabilities. Policy optimality is de…ned as the speci…c set of parameters in these rules that maximize welfare.
The investigation conducted here di¤ers from previous studies in three fundamental ways. First, while earlier research on optimal …scal and monetary policy rules focuses on closed economies, this paper studies this issue in the context of an open economy.
Second, previous research on optimal monetary policy in open economies abstracted from the in ‡uence of …scal policy by assuming that Government expenditures could be …nanced by nondistortionary lump sum taxes. 3 This paper contributes to this line of research by proposing an integrated framework for the analysis of optimal monetary and …scal policy rules, in an environment where distortionary income taxes a¤ect equilibrium allocations.
Finally, a distinctive feature of the model developed in this paper is that is tailored to capture essential features of emerging market economies, many of which have numeric targets for both the in ‡ation rate and …scal performance. Brazil, an economy that has had primary surplus and in ‡ation targets since 1999, was chosen as the benchmark case and the model was calibrated in order to match its features. 4 A stylized fact captured by the model is that emerging market economies typically cannot borrow in their own currency in foreign markets. This type of …nancial vulnerability has already been studied by Morón and Winkelreid (2005) , who investigate whether liability dollarization a¤ects the optimal implementation of in ‡ation targeting. The role of external borrowing constraints was explored in depth by Devereux, Lane and Xu (2005) in a sticky-price open economy model with tradables and nontradables, that investigates welfare maximizing monetary policy rules in emerging markets. In neither of these models do …scal constraints and …scal policy play a role in welfare determination. 4 Kopits (2004) provides an overview of …scal policy rules in Brazil and in several other economies. Table ( 1) in the appendix provides information about …scal-in ‡ation targets in a sample of emerging markets.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two lays out the analytical framework. Next, in sections 3 and 4 the calibration procedure is described, along with the dynamic responses of the economy to shocks. Section 5 discusses welfare results. Section 6 concludes.
The Model

Households
Households are endowed with a constant, nonstorable amount of a tradable good Y T every period.
They consume the tradable good C T and a bundle of nontradable goods C H . The consumption index is given by:
where the parameter captures the degree of openess of the economy. Nontradable goods consumption C H is an aggregate index of di¤erent varieties of nontradable goods produced by monopolistic producers, and is the elasticity of substitution across di¤erent varieties. The nontradable goods price index P H t and the nontradables consumption index are given by, respectively:
Let P T t denote the domestic price of the tradable good. Then the consumption price index is:
Optimal shares of consumption of tradables and nontradables are:
The real exchange rate is:
The international price of the tradable good P T is constant and, without loss of generality, equal to one. Let the nominal exchange rate be denoted by S t , then:
The nominal exchange rate change in period t is:
Households buy tradable and nontradable goods. Part of nontradable good purchases is consumed and the remaining is invested (i.e., it becomes addition to the capital stock). One period later, this increase in the capital stock and existent undepreciated capital is rented to nontradable goods producing …rms. Households also decide how many hours to work (N t ) at these …rms. Capital income (Q t ) and labor income (W t ) are subject to proportional taxation, at rate t . Households own the nontradable good producing …rms, and receive pro…ts t :
Households hold two types of bonds. One is a domestic bond issued by the Government, denominated in domestic currency (B t ) ; and pays, one period later, the risk free gross return (1 + i t ).
Households also hold internationally traded bonds D p t denominated in units of the tradable good.
Assume, without loss of generality, that households are net debtors in the external market, so D p t is the amount of net external liabilities that matures one period later, paying the gross interest rate
Finally, there is a cash-in-advance constraint (always binding) 5 , where M t are nominal money balances:
The household's problem is to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility:
subject to the ‡ow budget constraint,
and subject to (5), (6) and (10) . They cannot engage in Ponzi schemes.
Denoting U C and U N the partial derivatives of the utility function with respect to its arguments, and substituting (10) in (12), optimization requires the following …rst order conditions to hold (where t is the Lagrange multiplier of the ‡ow budget constraint):
where w t and q t+1 are, respectively, the real wage w t =
Wt
Pt and the one period ahead real rental rate of capital de…ned as q t+1 = Q t+1 P t+1
: The real exchange rate e is part of the capital Euler equation because the cost and return on capital are a¤ected by the current and future price of nontradable goods relative to the price index P t :
Upward sloping supply of foreign funds
The interest rate on foreign loans i F is given by:
There is a wedge between the interest rate charged on foreign loans to domestic residents, i F , and the constant world risk free nominal rate i . The wedge will depend on an exogenous variable and on an endogenous term Dt D
; de…ned as the ratio of the economy's total net foreign liabilities
Whenever D t D , the wedge between i F and i increases, depending on the elasticity 2 . A debt-elastic interest rate on foreign loans guarantees stationarity of net foreign assets.
The term is as an exogenous risk premium term, that captures international liquidity and risk aversion conditions. Unanticipated innovations in the process driving this variable plays the role of an external shock that hits the economy from time to time. The nonstochastic level is greater than zero, capturing the fact that the cost of borrowing for emerging markets is higher than the international risk free rate.
The risk premium follows an autoregressive process (in log deviations from the steady state ):
The assumption that the risk premium is exogenous with respect to domestic fundamentals is also adopted in other studies that seek to model emerging markets economic dynamics, like in Neumeyer 
Firms
There is a continuum of …rms in the nontradables sector, (indexed by i, i 2 [0; 1]), each producing output combining capital K and labor N , according to the constant returns to scale technology:
Each …rm is a monopolistic producer of a particular variety of nontradable good, facing a constant elasticity of demand . Demand faced by producer i is:
where
is the relative price of each variety with respect to the aggregate price index P H t ; y h i;t is demand for output produced by …rm i and Y H t is aggregate demand for nontradables.
Staggered price setting à la Calvo (1983) is assumed. At each point in time, a fraction (1 ) of the …rms receives a signal that will give them the possibility of setting new prices. Given the optimal quantities of capital and labor, a …rm that resets the price at time t (and has it …xed for (s-t) periods, with probability s t ) chooses the optimal price P i;t , in order to maximize expected pro…ts: 6 M ax
where r t;s is the stochastic discount factor de…ned as r t;s = E t
The real marginal cost of production rmc i;s is:
Optimal factor utilization also implies:
Given the assumption of constant returns to scale and of perfectly competitive input markets, rmc i;s will be identical across …rms. Then the optimal choice of P i;t is described by the …rst order condition:
Equation (25) says that the …rm will choose the optimal price P t in order to reach a certain mark-up of the expected discounted weighted sum of marginal revenues over marginal costs.
Typically, (25) is linearized around a non-distorted deterministic steady state with zero in ‡ation, which yields the familiar New-Keynesian Phillips curve. The alternative is to refrain from imposing this restriction. Speci…cally, the approach suggested by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b) is adopted
here. This procedure yields two dynamic equations (described in the appendix) for the weighted present discounted value of expected marginal costs x 1 and expected marginal revenues x 2 : In turn, pro…t maximization requires:
In a symmetric equilibrium, …rms that can change their prices chose the same optimal price P t :
Continuing to follow the notation of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b), the nontradables price index will be given by:
and hence in ‡ation H t in the nontradables sector is given by:
where e P t =
Market clearing requires that total supply of nontradable goods will be either consumed (C H t ), invested (inv t ), or purchased by the government (g t ) : Integrating over all …rms:
The output loss due to price dispersion is given by s t = R 1 0 P H i;t P H t and implies the relationship
where s t dynamics is given by:
Monetary Policy: In ‡ation Targeting
The Monetary Authority has an explicit target for CPI in ‡ation, which in turn is given by the weighted sum of the change in the nominal exchange rate and nontradables in ‡ation (in logs):
The nominal interest rate i t is the policy instrument, and is managed according to the following Taylor-type rule (Taylor (1993)):
where y is the non-stochastic stationary value of total output, i is the non stochastic stationary value of the nominal interest rate, and is the target for CPI in ‡ation. 7 The in ‡ation target is equal to steady state in ‡ation. For this assumption to be compatible with the existence of a stationary level of real money balances, it follows that money supply M S must be increasing at a rate equal to the in ‡ation rate. In equilibrium, money supply equals money demand
Moreover, the existence of a stationary level of money demand implies:
(34)
Fiscal Policy: A Public Debt Target
The Government ‡ow budget constraint is:
where g t = government expenditure on nontradable goods;
B t = risk-free nominal one period domestic government bonds;
D g = Government foreign debt, measured in units of the tradable good;
The ‡ow constraint says that public debt maturing at time t have to monetized (M t M t 1 );
rolled over (B t and S t D g ); or paid-o¤ with a primary surplus
Pt ; and use the de…nition (7) of the real exchange rate e t and of the price index (4). The real stock of government external debt, D g is assumed constant. In real terms, the budget constraint is:
The real primary surplus is:
Let h be real end of period government liabilities:
The No Ponzi Game Condition requires:
where R t;T is the expected stochastic discount factor.
The Government purchases exclusively nontradable goods. Real nontradable goods purchases, g t , measured in log-deviations from their stationary level, follows a stochastic process given by: 8
Given g t , the Fiscal Authority sets the tax rate in order to generate a primary surplus so that the real stock of Government liabilities h will remain in the neighborhood of the target h , according to the rule:
where 0 denotes the real primary surplus observed at the non-stochastic steady state.
Aggregate Resource Constraint
The aggregate resource constraint concludes the description of the model. The households (12) and Government ‡ow budget constraints (36) are combined and yield an expression for the current account, where D is the total stock of foreign liabilities:
Equilibrium
Given the households initial stock of assets, the initial price dispersion distortion, the tradable endowment, and the stochastic processes f ; gg ; an (imperfectly) competitive equilibrium is an allocation N; C H ; C T ; M; D p ; B; K , a price system i F ; P H ; P T ; S t ; W t ; Q t , and a Govern-ment policy fi; ; ; h g such that:
(1) Households maximize utility subject to constraints, (5), (6) , (10), (12) , the initial asset position and the No-ponzi game condition.
(2) Firms maximize pro…ts.
(3) Markets Clear:
(by Walras Law the capital market is cleared). The period utility function is given by:
Preferences and technology parameters are in a range consistent with empirical …ndings. Table (2) summarizes the calibration.
[ Table ( 2) here]
Data on the Brazilian JP Morgan EMBI spread was used as a measure of the left hand side of (18), after rewriting this expression as:
The threshold D is the average level of net foreign liabilities between 1995 and 2004. The interest rate spread between US corporate investment grade and "junk" bonds was used as a proxy for the risk premium t , consistent with the interpretation that this variable captures exogenous changes in international liquidity and risk aversion. The parameters 1 and 2 were calibrated in order to match the mean and the variance of the variables in (44).
The next step was to estimate the AR(1) process that describes the dynamics of the risk premium t , according to (19) . The estimated autoregressive coe¢ cient is 0.92 and the residual of the regression has a standard deviation of 0.006.
The estimation of the autoregressive process (40) that characterizes Government expenditures on goods was based on constant prices, seasonally adjusted, 4 quarters moving average of quarterly data on expenditures (excluding interest payments) of the overall public sector as a share of output.
A dummy was included in the regression in order to capture the e¤ect of the political cycle. The estimated coe¢ cient of lagged government expenditures g is 0.56 and the standard deviation of the estimated residual is 0.014.
Dynamic Responses
The model is solved numerically, based on a second order approximation of the equilibrium conditions of the model around the (log) of steady state values, using the method developed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a). The system of equations used when solving the model is detailed in the appendix. Figures (1) and (2) in the appendix display impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to government spending on goods and to the risk premium. These impulse responses were generated after solving the model under two di¤erent scenarios:
(1) The monetary and the …scal authorities target CPI in ‡ation and public debt, respectively, according to rules (33) and (41). The policy rule parameters are those that maximize welfare 11 ,
given the parameter range previously described. Speci…cally, = 2:15; y = 0:55; 1 = 1: Producers have then the incentive to raise their prices. Nontradables in ‡ation increases, which triggers monetary policy tightening under CPI targeting. Consistent with uncovered interest rate parity, the nominal exchange rate appreciates on impact, and then depreciates henceforth. The initial optimal, the welfare consequences of [5; 15] (with increments = 0.5) were also considered. 1 0 Ascari and Rotele (2005) show that equilibrium determinacy is a¤ected by the presence of trend in ‡ation, or the fact that in ‡ation is larger than zero in the long run. This feature enlarges the indeterminacy region in the parameter space. For example, with two percent trend in ‡ation, they …nd that the determinacy region lies (roughly) below a 45 degree line departing from ; y = (1; 0): A similar result is found in this paper, since trend in ‡ation is also present in the environment considered here. 1 1 See discussion in the next session.
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate causes a decline in the price of tradable goods, measured in domestic currency. Therefore, the overall increase in the CPI index is not as large as it would have been, in the absence monetary policy tightening and the corresponding exchange rate movement.
The appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, coupled with higher nontradables in ‡ation result in an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This, in turn, triggers an expenditure switching e¤ect, and households consume less nontradable goods and more tradable goods. The result is a temporary current account de…cit and increase in net foreign liabilities.
The tightening of monetary policy also results in a temporary increase in government debt h, due to higher interest rate payments on debt. The tax rate is increased in order to generate enough tax revenues to compensate for increased government spending on goods, and also because the relative price of goods purchased by the government increased (due to the real exchange rate appreciation).
Tax rates also have to be raised so that the Fiscal Authority starts paying o¤ higher interest rate expenses.
The dynamics is similar when the Monetary Authority targets nontradables in ‡ation (dotted lines in the impulse responses). In this case, monetary policy tightening engineers an increase in the
expected real interest rate that is large enough to reduce households'nontradables consumption, to a point such that the tendency of marginal costs of production to increase is signi…cantly reduced.
The combination of loose government spending and tight monetary policy implies that government spending crowds out private nontradables consumption.
The E¤ect of a Risk Premium Shock
Figure (2) in the appendix illustrates the e¤ect of risk premium shock. The increase in the cost of foreign funding prompts a temporary reduction in net external debt. This is achieved with a reduction in overall consumption, combined with expenditure switching away from tradable goods. In turn, potentially higher demand for nontradable goods provides incentive for nontradable producers to raise their prices. Monetary policy is tightened and the increase in the real interest rate results in a reduction in consumption.
Nontradables in ‡ation rises and then decreases gradually, while the nominal exchange rate de-preciates (once again, consistent with the uncovered interest rate parity condition). This results in a gradual depreciation of the real exchange rate, which, combined with lower overall consumption, is conducive to a decline of net foreign liabilities.
Because the depreciation of the exchange rate leads to a temporary expansion of nontradables output, the tax base increases and initially the Fiscal Authority can reach its primary surplus objective with a lower tax rate. However, the cost of servicing public debt increases over time due to higher real interest rates and the primary surplus has to be revised upwards, leading to an increase in tax rates.
The dynamics is similar under a policy of nontradables in ‡ation targeting. The di¤erence now is that in order to keep nontradables in ‡ation close to the target, the Monetary Authority has to engineer a larger reduction in consumption, so that nontradables consumption does not increase much. The stronger monetary policy tightening results in an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate on impact.
5 Welfare Analysis
Methodology
Welfare is the present discounted value of expected lifetime utility, conditional on the state variables of the economy being at the stationary steady state at time zero. 12 The welfare loss is the percentage of consumption under the optimal policy that the household would be willing to give up, in order to be indi¤erent between the optimal policy and the alternative policy. (The appendix provides details of the computation).
Once the model is solved for all the possible parameter combinations, attention is restricted to the set of policy parameter combinations that yield a determinate equilibrium and also that correspond to a stochastic equilibrium such that the unconditional means of state variables do not deviate signi…cantly from their stationary values. Speci…cally, the following condition should be satis…ed:
where EX t is the vector of unconditional means of the state variables of the model and X the vector of nonstochastic steady state values of these variables. The motivation for imposing such restriction is that some policy parameter combinations result in unconditional means that deviate from their nonstochastic steady state value by an amount that renders the second-order approximation around the stationary value very imprecise. Kollman (2006) also detects this problem and imposes a similar restriction.
Main Findings
The main conclusions can be summarized as follows:
(i) A strong anti-in ‡ation stance is optimal, even though complete in ‡ation stabilization is not.
(ii) Should policymakers target a domestic in ‡ation index, as opposed to CPI, there would be large welfare gains.
(iii) Despite the intertemporal distortions imposed by time varying taxes, the model favors fast …scal adjustments, with the optimal responsiveness of the primary surplus to debt deviations from target ranging from 0.35 to 1, depending on the speci…c in ‡ation index being targeted.
These results are reported in Table ( 3), which shows the volatility of selected variables, the optimal policy and the welfare loss associated to alternative policies:
(a) CPI targeting -Line (A) in Table ( Table ( 3). The monetary policy rule parameters remain the same = 2:15; y = 0:55 but now 1 = 0:05 is imposed. The volatility of public debt becomes signi…cantly higher, but the welfare loss is small (compared to the case of optimal CPI targeting with fast …scal adjustment).
One of the reasons is that the policy that prescribes a slow …scal adjustment delivers a very similar level of tax rate volatility. The intuition is that, as the adjustment gets postponed, the size of the …scal imbalance gets larger, hence higher tax rate adjustments are required in the future.
(c) Complete stabilization of domestic (nontradables) in ‡ation -Next, the welfare consequences of a policy that completely stabilizes nontradables in ‡ation at its nonstochastic level is investigated. The literature on optimal monetary policy in open economies has shown that this policy yields superior welfare compared to CPI targeting. The rationale is that with CPI in ‡ation targeting, the nominal exchange rate ‡uctuation is being implicitly targeted, especially if the degree of pass through from the exchange rate to prices is large. In the case of emerging markets, even when the degree of pass-through is low, the impact of the exchange rate on tradable prices is large, because of the large magnitude of exchange rate ‡uctuations. 13 The problem is that exchange rate is only indirectly related to the primary source of ine¢ ciency in the economy, which is price dispersion in the sector that faces nominal price rigidities. Therefore, a policy that directly addresses this problem -by eliminating or reducing the incentive of producers to change prices -can potentially improve welfare.
It is interesting to examine if this conclusion carries through to an environment with distortionary taxes and with a simultaneous …scal target. The procedure was to use domestic in ‡ation instead of CPI in the monetary policy rule. The parameter was set arbitrarily large, in order to ensure a complete stabilization of nontradables in ‡ation at . The remaining policy parameters are left unconstrained.
Line (C) in Table ( 3) shows that a policy that eliminates nontradables in ‡ation volatility delivers a higher level of welfare compared to CPI targeting. Optimal policy features a fast …scal adjustment
In this case, the response to output ‡uctuations y is immaterial for welfare (results reported corresponding to the case y = 0). This is a case of interest because the nonstochastic in ‡ation level does not necessarily deliver an e¢ cient allocation. Therefore, a policy of keeping nontradables in ‡ation constant at that level might not be optimal. This suspicion is con…rmed by results in line (D) in Table ( 3). There is an additional welfare gain when domestic in ‡ation is targeted as opposed to CPI, this time allowing for some (small) volatility of nontradables in ‡ation around its non-stochastic level.
Optimal policy features a quite active response to output ‡uctuations ( y = 1) and a somewhat more sluggish responsiveness of the primary surplus to deviations of public debt with respect to the target ( 1 = 0:35): This result was partially driven by constraint (45). This is the only case in which this constraint binds, ruling out parameter combinations that yield an even higher level of welfare.
In fact, given , welfare tends to be higher with a smaller y (zero, in most cases) and with a larger …scal response 1 = 1: However, with this parameter con…guration the deviation of the capital stock unconditional mean with respect to its nonstochastic level is larger than one percent.
(e) Fixed exchange rate regime -Finally, line (E) in Table ( 3) reports the welfare loss associated to a …xed exchange rate regime, which is accomplished by a monetary policy rule that is designed to eliminate nominal exchange rate ‡uctuations. Nominal exchange rate changes replace the in ‡ation index in the monetary policy rule and the response of the interest rate to exchange rate ‡uctuations, er is set arbitrarily large. This policy implies a large welfare loss.
[ Table ( 3) here]
Discussion of Welfare Results
A useful way to interpret these results is to think about how agents in this incomplete markets, bonds-only economy react to risk. Precautionary savings imply that it is optimal to reduce the level of foreign borrowing, especially taking into account that the nonstochastic level of foreign debt is not e¢ cient (remember that with an upward sloping supply of funds, each individual agent's borrowing decisions in ‡uence the cost of external borrowing faced by the economy, generating a negative externality).
This is why, in all policy regimes considered here, the unconditional mean of net foreign assets will be lower than its stationary nonstochastic level. This can be seen in Table ( 4), which reports the percentage deviation of the unconditional means of some key variables with respect to their nonstochastic steady state level.
[ Table (4) here] Table ( 4) shows that the decline in the foreign debt position is smaller, the larger is the weight of exchange ‡uctuations in the monetary policy rule. The reason is that policies that implicitly target the nominal exchange rate -at the extreme, a …xed exchange rate regime -minimize the volatility of the cost of external borrowing, and end up promoting an ine¢ ciently high level of external debt.
Moreover, they do not address directly one of the main distortions in the model, namely the price dispersion in the nontradables sector.
A policy of targeting domestic nontradables in ‡ation is optimal because it addresses these two sources of ine¢ ciency simultaneously. Since it does not target exchange rate movements, this policy does not interfere with ‡uctuations in the cost of borrowing from abroad in foreign currency. In light of that, agents adjust accordingly, reducing their debt exposure down to an e¢ cient level. At the same time, by reducing the volatility of in ‡ation in the nontradables sector, this policy is mitigating the output loss associated to price dispersion in this sector.
There is a third channel that reinforces the optimality of a policy of domestic in ‡ation targeting.
The reduction in foreign debt exposure comes from a combination of higher savings and expenditure switching away from tradable goods. This boosts domestic capital accumulation and nontradables output, increasing the tax base. As a consequence, the unconditional mean tax rate will be lower than its stationary level, as can be seen in Table (4) .
This provides some intuition for why the model delivers the result that fast …scal adjustments are optimal. With fast …scal adjustments, the increase in savings fund capital accumulation and not additional government borrowing. The positive impact on the tax base makes room for a reduction of tax rates. Therefore, even though a fast …scal adjustment increases the intertemporal tax distortion, it is conducive to a reduction of the level of taxes and hence to a decrease of the intratemporal tax distortion in the stochastic equilibrium.
Conclusions
This paper identi…es welfare maximizing policy rules when there are explicit numeric targets for both the in ‡ation rate and public debt. The framework is tailored to capture essential features of emerging markets economies, whose adoption of in ‡ation-…scal targeting regimes was typically a consequence of IMF conditionality. The model is calibrated using Brazilian data.
Welfare is investigated in the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that
describes a small open economy with capital accumulation, distortionary taxation and nominal price rigidities. The model is solved using a second-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions, and optimal policy parameters are identi…ed.
The paper shows that previous …ndings in the literature on optimal policy rules -in particular, that a strong anti-in ‡ation stance is optimal, in the presence of price rigidities -continue to hold in a more general environment. Speci…cally, low in ‡ation volatility is still a feature of optimal policy in an open economy, after accounting for the e¤ect of distortionary taxation and for the coexistence of …scal and in ‡ation targets. Moreover, despite intertemporal distortions triggered by …scal adjustments, …scal discipline (in the form of low public debt volatility around its target) is optimal due to its welfare improving, long term e¤ects on tax rates.
These are important …ndings, in light of the …scal constraints that are typical of emerging market economies, namely a large stock of short term debt and a corresponding spillover from short term interest rate management to the cost of servicing public debt. Speci…cally, negative implications of restrictive monetary policy to the …scal accounts are frequently identi…ed as a reason why monetary policy should be less restrictive. In the context of in ‡ation targeting, it is argued that the Monetary Authority should tolerate deviations of in ‡ation from the target, as a way to avoid higher interest rates and the corresponding increase of the cost of outstanding debt. This paper shows that this strategy can have large negative implications for welfare, and that the policy debate should rather be focused on which in ‡ation index to target, given that the strategy currently pursued -CPI targeting -is not optimal.
Appendix
Welfare Measure
Welfare is the conditional expectation of discounted lifetime utility of the representative agent (conditional on the economy being at the non-stochastic steady state at time zero). Let W opt be the welfare associated to the optimal policy:
Let W sub be the lower level of welfare associated to a di¤erent, suboptimal policy. The measure of the welfare loss is the percentage of consumption under the optimal policy that the representative agent would have to give up in order to be indi¤erent between a policy that delivers W opt and a policy that delivers W sub : Formally,
Some algebra manipulation yields an expression for :
Rearranging terms:
Equilibrium conditions
Let y t be the vector of endogenous variables and z t = [z 1 t z 2 t ] be the vector of predetermined variables at time t, with z 1 t being the vector of endogenous state variables and z 2 t the vector of exogenous state variables. In the context of the present model,
The remaining variables of the model can be expressed as function of y t and z t ; using (6), (10) , (18), (23), (24), (26), (28), (30), the de…nition of CPI in ‡ation (32), the primary surplus rule (41) and the aggregate resource constraint (42).
The model comprises a set of equilibrium conditions that can be written in the general format
where f is given by the following 14 equilibrium conditions, in which r t;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor:
Capital Euler equation:
Bonds Euler equation:
Uncovered interest rate parity:
Nontradables market clearing:
Optimal tradables consumption:
Ine¢ ciency due to price dispersion:
Dynamic equation for the present discounted value of marginal costs:
Dynamic equation for the present discounted value of revenues:
x 2;t+1 :
Government real ‡ow budget constraint:
Real exchange rate dynamics:
Real tax revenues:
Monetary policy rule:
Country risk premium process:
Government spending process:
7. 
